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I. INTRODUCTION

Consumer confidence is a fundamental requirement in order for the
European Union (EU) to successfully become a single market.' To secure this
confidence, the consumer must be protected from physical and financial harms
arising from transnational purchases within the EU. This Note discusses
European Community legislation that uses injunctive relief to bolster
consumer protection and confidence.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION IN EUROPE AND
THE MASS DEFAULT SCENARIO

Article 129 of the Maastricht Treaty, the treaty creating the EU and
outlining the goal of a single market, established a title to implement the
mission of a "high level" of consumer protection.2 The elevation of the
consumer protection priority to a possibly constitutional level emphasizes its

J.D. 2000, The University of Georgia.
Consumer confidence is necessary for the harmonious functioning ofthe single market and
"[t]he interests of consumers must be taken into account in the same way as those of other
economic actors." Draft Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council
Establishing a General Framework for Community Activities in Favor of Consumers,
COM(97)684 final at 2 [hereinafter Draft Proposal for a Decision in Favor of Consumers].
2 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992),
[1992] 1C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; see Jerome Huet, RecentDevelopments
in the FieldofConsumer Protectionin the EuropeanCommunity, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 583,590 (1993) (noting that although expressed primarily in approximation legislation,
consumer protection policy is not merely a means to the end of a free market but an end in
*

itself); see also Paulee A. Coughlin, Comment, The Movement of Consumer Protection in the
European Community: A Vital Link in the Establishment of Free Trade and a Paradigmfor
North America, 5 IND. INT'L &COMP. L. REv. 143, 158 (1994) (describing the two fundamental

goals of the EU as the free movement of goods and a uniformly high level of protection for
consumers); George T. Brady, Note, Consumer Protectionin the European Community: Hope
for the Consumer or Unfulfilled Promises?,23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 155, 157 (1997)

(stating that if consumers are harmed when buying in the single market, they will come to regard
the process of European integration skeptically, thus chilling the single market).
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importance.3 There is broad awareness of the significance of consumer
protection in the EU. A commission report stated that the "reactions [of
Member States, Community institutions, consumer advocacy groups, firms,
lawyers, judges were] unanimous ...on the fact that the existence of effective
means of redress for consumer disputes is an essential condition for the
smooth functioning of the Single Market."4 The European Economic and
Social Committee expressed this sentiment more emphatically, stating that
"the credibility of the European construction is at stake in the question of
consumer protection." 5
Consumer confidence and the ultimate success of the single market
depends on consumer belief that the purchase of an item from another member
state will be backed by the same level of protection as in their own country.
While consumers may not be willing to initiate legal action to redress a
grievance suffered in the course of a transnational transaction, they may be
willing to subsequently avoid transnational transactions altogether.
The commission recognizes the significance of a possible chilling effect on
transnational commerce and has endeavored "to ensure that all Member States
provide for some form of representative action" to compensate for "the
prohibitive costs to individuals of bringing a legal action."6
There are many situations in which "slight harms" could result in
deterioration of consumer confidence in the single market. For example,
suppose a financial organization in member state A imposes harsh severance
penalties on consumers who wish to surrender their life insurance policies or
repay their loans early.7 Suppose these penalties are in violation of European
Community (EC) law regulating consumer credit practices or unfair contract

3 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EC CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 25 (1997). "Article 129a
offers the prospect for a consumer policy no longer subordinate to the dictates of internal market
policy." Id. This is because "it offers scope for regarding consumer policy as more than an
indirect consequence of internal market policy." Id. at 152.
" Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Injunctions for the
Protection of Consumers' Interest, COM(95)712 final at 3 [hereinafter Proposal for Injunction

Directive].
' Committee ofthe Regions Opinion on the Green Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice
and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market, 1994 O.J. (C 217) 29, 30
[hereinafter Committee of the Regions Opinion] (noting that the Committee of the Regions
called on the commission to treat consumer dispute settlement as a matter of priority and to make
full use of the opportunities created by article 129(a)).
6 Proposal for Injunction Directive, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Committee of the Regions,
supra note 5, at 30).
' See Jeremy Mitchell, Response to the Commission Green Paper: Financial Services:
Meeting Consumers' Expectations, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 379, 382 (1997).
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terms.8 Assume further that the degree to which the individual consumer is
harmed is slight enough that the gamut of disincentives facing the individual
in such a situation, such as the cost of litigation and the mountain of procedural barriers,9 are such that pursuing legal recourse will invariably be opted
against. Finally, suppose that the aggregate injury and the "ill-gotten gains"
for the violator amount to a great sum of money but the violator has far more
resources to use in a legal dispute than the injured individual.' ° Such a
situation is referred to as a mass default."
There are three conditions under which mass defaults arise. First, there is
an intentional or negligent failure to advise consumers of their risk of loss or
actual loss due to the malfeasance of the defaulter; second, the risk of loss is
unlikely to be detected by similarly situated consumers; third, the defaulter
profits by not having to compensate consumers for the harm. 2
The mass default is not an isolated event. It is characteristic of economies
directed toward mass production, distribution, and consumption. ' These large
"[b]usinesses repeatedly subject consumers to mass breach of contract,
unreasonable bank surcharges, the deprivation of guaranteed health and
welfare benefits, violations of product warranties, and excessive finance

' That is, violating Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Consumer Credit, 1987 O.J. (L 42) 48 (as last amended by Directive 98/7/EC, 1998
O.J. (L 101) 17) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Directive] and Council Directive 93/13/EEC of
5 Apr. 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 [hereinafter Unfair
Contracts Directive], respectively.
' Reasons why consumers may not pursue legally well-founded claims include the expense
inlight of the small chances of winning a small amount and the social and psychological factors
discouraging the pursuit of the suit. See Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass
Justice: A Swedish Perspectiveand Proposalon Group Actions in Civil Procedure,45 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 805, 817 (1997); see also WEATHERILL, supranote 3, at 146 ("[C]onsumers frequently
write off disappointing purchases," especially where dealing with a non-home member state's
avenues of consumer redress. "[L]iterally the last thing a consumer wants to do is go through
the expense and delay of pursuing formal proceedings in court.").
" This has been referred to as the problem of balance. See Leon E. Trakman, David Meets
Goliath: Consumers Unite Against Big Business, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 617, 620 (1994)
(noting that the violators "not only benefit from the breach, but the inability of consumers to
launch a legal challenge fails to deter future breaches").
" See id. at 617.
12 See id.
" See Lindbolm, supra note 9, at 817; see also Economic and Social Committee Opinion
on the Green Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes
in the Single Market, 1994 O.J. (C 295) 4 [hereinafter ESC Green Paper Opinion] (noting that
"the increase in the number of legal relations in general, and consumer-related ones in particular,
is... a natural consequence of the Single Market...").
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charges. Recognizing their victim's failure or reluctance to sue, mass
defaulters sometimes breach with impunity.""' Legal issues stemming from
the complexities of the internationalization of trade open the door for judicial
institutions to play an increasingly significant role. 5 To secure the linchpin
of consumer confidence, European legal institutions should be prepared to deal
with claims against mass defaulters that might otherwise escape justice
through gaps left by the disharmony of national laws and the practical
limitations on consumers seeking redress for transnational transactions.
Actions must be brought in order to maintain and build confidence, to prevent6
defaulters from unjustly benefitting at the expense of reputable businesses,'
and ultimately, to secure the integration of the single market.
I. THE ROLE OF THE EC IN CONSUMER PROTECTION

A. EC Responsibility
It is the place of the EC to protect the consumers in the single market. Not
only can "consumers... be protected better at the European level than at the
national level . . . ,,,t but consumers expect and support such action."
Consumer protection policy must be formed at the European level for several
reasons. First, no single member state has the authority to generate
community-wide law, and so no single member state can address the problem

of generating consumer confidence in the single market.' 9 Furthermore, EC
"' Trakman, supra note 10, at 620; see Resolution 339/96 of February 1997 on the
Commission Green Paper on Financial Services-Meeting Consumer's Expectations, 1997 0..
(C 85) 137. In this resolution, the European Parliament stated: "[There have been cases where
vulnerable persons have been defrauded or misled by unscrupulous financial operators,
demonstrating the need for strong consumer protection at the European level. ..
" See Lindbolm, supra note 9, at 818.
16 See id. at 817-18.

."

Id.

17 Huet, supra note 2, at 590. "[I]n this time of economic difficulties when member states
are more concerned about business profits than improving the quality of life, EC legislation
rather than legislation by specific member states is the better tool to protect consumer interests."

Id. at 584.

" A Eurobarometer poll shows that almost nine out of ten Europeans support the EU's
development of consumer protection. See Eur-op News, Consumers Should Give a 'Hitlist of

Concerns' (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://eur-op.eu.intlopnews/397/en/r317.htm>.
"9See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 151. "Recognizing the inadequacy of national laws to
protect consumers within a common market, the Community determined that 'the creation of a
European Community with a common market necessitates a comprehensive and coherent policy
at Community level in order to protect consumers.' " Id. at 151 (quoting George Argiros,
Consumer Safety and the Single European Market: Some Observations and Proposals, LEGAL
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institutions are the only bodies with the authority to carry out community-wide
initiatives due to the primacy and direct applicability of community law.20 So,
while it is within the member states that the consumers' cases will be heard,
it is the EC governing institutions that must compel member states to adopt
effective consumer protection legislation.2
B. EC ConsumerProtectionPolicy
The EC has not been remiss in addressing the need to protect consumers in
the single market. The first program for a consumer protection and information policy, adopted by the Council of the European Communities in 1975,
listed "proper redress . . .by means of swift, effective, and inexpensive
procedures"22 as one of consumers' five fundamental rights. While a body of
EC law exists to secure the other four fundamental consumer rights,' the EC
has not achieved uniform protection of the right to redress. While the debate
concerning substantive limitations of consumer protection measures in the EC

ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION, 1990/1, at 139, 140.
20 See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 151.
" This responsibility is explained well in the Commission's Proposal for an Injunction
Directive, supra note 4, at 7 ("[B]earing in mind the intra-Community dimension of the
infringements in question, as well as the 'compartmentalization' of a national means of redress,
the coordination of national rules governing these means of redress is crucial for the effective
and non-discriminatory application of the underlying Community law and, hence, the smooth
functioning of the single market.").
22Preliminary Program of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection
and Information Policy, 1975 O.J. (C92) 1, 8.
" The other four rights are as follows: "[t]he right to protection of health and safety, the
right to protection of economic interests, the right to information and education, the right to
representation .... Id. For instance, "[t]here are now several Community texts which endow
consumers with a set of concrete rights that can be relied on in all the Member States." "These
rights concern Product liability, consumer credit, doorstep selling, package holidays,
overbooking in air transport... unfair [contract] terms, contracts negotiated at a distance, and
timeshares...." Id.
24 See generally Brady, supra note 2, at 155 (commenting that the goal in establishing the
single market, removing barriers between countries, has failed due to insufficiency of consumer
protection measures, and the lack of information and complexity of national law). But some
argue that there is a changing tide in consumer protection. See Gabriele Silingardi, Tourist
Contractual Protection by Directive ofthe European Community: No. 314 on Package Travel,
20 HAMLI L. REv. 611, 619 (1997) (arguing that the community directive on package travel
is an example, with its clarity and express rights of redress and to compensation, of its tendency
to promote quality, which will "improv[e] the standards of the market [and]... weed out th[e]
abusers").
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thrives, 5 it is clear that there are serious procedural limitations on the
effectiveness of consumer protection measures.26 The conditions discussed
above, including the gaps in the legislation and the legal obstacles, seem to
increase the potential for, if not invite, mass defaults. If the EC is not able to
protect consumers from these individually small but collectively huge losses
of money and confidence, then the linchpin of consumer confidence will not
be secure.
The questions is, therefore, what is being done to secure the protection of
EC citizens from mass defaults and to assure redress when defaults occur in
order to protect consumer confidence in the single market. The mass default
is a special situation because, unlike individual claimants who can generally
find specific protection, there is a lack of protection from mass defaults. This
lack of protection probably compromises consumer confidence to a significant
degree.
The remainder of this Note focuses on recent EC legislation intended to
grant consumers a means of redress for harm to their interests by way of an
injunction.27 The Injunction Directive will be considered in light of the need
for group consumer actions' against those who are committing or have
committed mass defaults. 29 Proceeding by this method will more fully expose
2s Some of the most cogent criticism has come from within community institutions
themselves. The Draft Proposal for Activities in Favor of Consumers stated that community
action in favor of consumers has been piecemeal, needs to be more intensive and effective, and
"the high level of protection for consumers remains an objective requiring a special effort by the
community." The Economic and Social Committee found it "difficult to understand why
consumers do not enjoy at community level the same protection which they enjoy under national
laws in some Member States." Opinion on Consumer Protection and Completion of the Internal
Market, 1991 O.J. (C 339) 18. Furthermore, "[t]he problem ofwatered down initiatives plagued
the Community and prevented the consumer from realizing maximum protection." Brady, supra
note 2, at 160 n.35.
' These include problems implementing directives and the vagueness of directives. See
Brady, supra note 2, at 164, 165; see also Alasdair R. Young, Towards a More Vigorous
European Consumer Policy?, 7 EUR. Bus. J. 34, 36 (1995) (discussing the ineffectiveness of
consumer groups charged with initiating the legal proceedings).
27 See European Parliament and Council Directive 98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions
for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 [hereinafter Injunction
Directive]. The deadline for implementation by member states is January 1,2001.
" These will be analogous to, but not substitutes for, class actions, for which the European
Community does not provide.
29 The term "mass default" is borrowed from an article that used it to describe the condition
in which a consumer has been harmed, but only to a small degree, such that the "cost of an
individual suit and the likelihood of winning meager damages" deter the consumer from
pursuing a breach. However, if aggregated with other consumers suffering the same injury, the
combined harm would add up to be of a significant order. See Trakman, supra note 10, at 617.
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the potentially progressive nature of the directive and of the latest efforts by
the EC to protect consumers in the single market by ensuring their confidence.
Though the Injunction Directive adds some teeth to EC consumer
protection law, those teeth are loose due to the directive's main flaws. First,
there is the fallacy that the Injunction Directive will be able to expedite the
process of enjoining violations notwithstanding the fact that it is still limited
by the constraints on the effectiveness of the directives it was designed to
improve. Another problem with the directive is that it does not provide for a
damage complement that is required to ensure justice, and thus confidence."
Lastly, the action is available only to qualified consumer organizations, to the
exclusion of individual citizens.3 Though the legislation itself may be limited,
there are other community institutions, such as the European Court of Justice,
that have assumed aggressive and critical roles in ensuring the efficacy of
community legislation, which may bolster consumer protection.
IV. THE INJUNCTION DIRECTIVE
The Injunction Directive is intended to address the "urgent need for some
degree of approximation of national provisions designed to enjoin the
cessation of [violations of consumer protection regulations] irrespective of the
country inwhich the unlawful practice has produced its effects.. . . " This
"urgent need" arises from the ability to avoid prosecution for victimizing
consumers by simply relocating to another member state with lower
standards34 and from the recognition that mechanisms available at the
national3" and community levels to ensure compliance with consumer

30

This problem has been addressed by an EC institution, the Economic and Social

Committee (ESC), that indicated that the directive would be too limited, and "[c]onsideration
should be given to the case for liability actions, which would be an effective complement to

injunctions." Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests,'

1997 O.J. (C 30) 112, 113 [hereinafter ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal].

3 See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, art. 3.
32 See Roger J. Goebel, Achieving Full Effectiveness of Community Law: The Court of

Justice's Third Stage of Enforcement Rules, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 159, 159 (1997).

" Injunction Directive, supra note 27, preamble, para. 6.
' See id. preamble, para. 4.
35While most national legal systems allow actions for injunctions, "the effectiveness of such
measures is jeopardized whenever the illegal practice concerned originates in a different country
from that in which its effects are felt." ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra
note 30, para. 1.3.

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 28:527

protection directives, were failing to terminate violations in good time.36
These failures were recognized as disrupting the "smooth functioning of the
37 and likely diminishing "consumer confidence in the internal
internal market"
38
market."
There was a need for the Injunction Directive, particularly in regards to
mass default situations. "Such collective action represents an important
mechanism for securing law enforcement in light of the inability of an
individual consumer relying on the private law effectively to dissuade
widespread malpractice. 39 It has been noted that collective action has tended
to fall apart in the face of transnational disputes.' The more proactive
measures of the Injunction Directive may address this problem.
A. Advances Made by the Injunction Directive
1. Mutual Recognition. By applying the principle of mutual recognition,
the Injunction Directive takes a major step toward overcoming a traditionally
prohibitive barrier to consumer organizations seeking to stop mass defaults.
At the time of the Proposal for an Injunction Directive, the existing directives
covered by the Injunction Directive"1 had two limits: 1) only qualified entities
36 See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, preamble, para. 2.

Id. preamble, para. 4.
s Id. preamble, para. 5.
39WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 148.
40 See id.
"' List of Directives Covered by the Injunction Directive, in Annex: Council Directive
84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 Relating to the Approximation of Laws, Regulations,
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Misleading Advertising, 1984 O.J.
(L 250) 17 [hereinafter Misleading Advertising Directive]; Council Directive 89/577/EEC of 20
December 1985 to Protect the Consumer in Respect to Contracts Negotiated Away From
Business Premises, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 [hereinafter Away from Business Contract Directive];
Consumer Credit Directive, supra note 8; Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on
the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation, or Administrative
Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities: Articles
10 to 21, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 (as amended by Directive 97/36/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60
[hereinafter TV Directive]; Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on Package Travel,
Package Holiday and Package Tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 [hereinafter Package Travel
Directive]; Council Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the Advertising of Medicinal
Products for Human Use, 1992 O.J. (L 113) 13 [hereinafter Medical Products Advertising
Directive]; Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 8; Directive 94/47/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 1994 on the Protection of Purchasers in Respect
of Certain Aspects of Contracts Relating to the Purchase of the Right to Use Immovable
Properties on a Timeshare Basis, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83 [hereinafter Timeshare Directive];
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the
"
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could bring the action and 2) "in certain Member States the very admissibility
of the action [was] predicated on the infringement of a provision of national
law."12 The first limitation still exists and is discussed later, but the second
limitation was addressed by the application of mutual recognition to the
qualified entities.43
,Mutual recognition is a principle that for this case means that a "qualified
entity" in member state A may apply directly to the court in member state B
or initiate proceedings through another qualified entity in member state B."
Without mutual recognition, there may be no legal obligation for member state
B to execute judgments won by groups in member state A (or even member
state B's groups representing the member state A complainant) without
international conventions addressing it."5 But under the Injunction Directive,
"[w]hen practices contrary to... [the covered directives] are detected... in
a Member State apart from the one in which they originated, the Directive
requires the relevant bodies in the second Member State to take direct or
indirect action in the first one." This application of the principle of mutual
recognition has been touted by member states' consumer ministries as a
notable achievement47 and is perhaps the most progressive element of the
Injunction Directive.
Nigel Griffiths, chair of the consumer agenda under the United Kingdom
presidency, said the following of the Injunction Directive: "I warmly welcome

Protection of Consumers in Respect to Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. See Injunction
Directive, supra note 27, annex.
42 Proposal for Injunction Directive, supra note 4, at 6. This "judicial frontier" is "often
insurmountable, either because standing to sue is the privilege of national representative entities
. . . or because the admissibility of the action is predicated on applicability of national
substantive law.... [I]n many cases of misleading advertising exclusively addressed to French
customers from a post office box in Germany, the action for an injunction brought in Germany
by a German organization has thus been declared inadmissible 'since the practice does not affect
the German Market.' " Id. (quoting Case 4 HKO 21 509/91 Landgericht Munich, 2 April
1994.).
"' See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, preamble, para. 11.
" See ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra note 30, para. 1.5.
45 See Bob Scmitz, Advertisingand CommercialCommunications-Towardsa Coherentand
Effective EC Policy, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER POLICY AFTER MAASTRICHT 110, 115 (Norbert
Reich & Geoffrey Woodroffe eds., 1994).
" Consumer Council:Agreements on GuaranteesandInjunctions,EUROPEAN REPORT, Apr.
25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8801632.
47 See DT: Griffiths HailsNew Era in InternationalCooperation,M2PRESSWIRE, June 17,
1998, available in 1998 WL 12975121 (quoting Nigel Griffiths as saying that "[a]nother of the
UK's Presidency objectives was achieved when European Consumer Ministers adopted the
Directive on Injunctions").
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the new powers. Giving consumer bodies the power to seek injunctions will
mean added protection for the consumer, especially in cross border cases
where in the past action has been difficult." '
Furthermore, the Injunction Directive allows for orders requiring violators
to pay into the public purse, or any beneficiary designated under national
legislation, when the violator fails to comply within the time period specified
by the courts or administrative authorities.49
2. The Injunction Directive Is a Stronger Mandate. The Injunction
Directive is applicable to those actions arising under the consumer protection
directives enumerated in the annex,5 ° some of which already had injunction
provisions." Compared to the injunction-granting portions of those directives,
the Injunction Directive is more specific and forceful. It is indicative of the
more assertive stance the EC has taken by issuing it. For instance, article
seven of the Unfair Contracts Directive states only that "Member States shall
ensure that. . . adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued
[infraction]," without any qualifiers regarding promptness of response, degree
of urgency, etc. 2 The Injunction Directive directs that member states must be
able to issue orders with "all due expediency" by way of "summary
procedure," and where appropriate, accompanied by "publication of the
decision" and/or the "corrective statement with
a view toward eliminating the
53
continuing effects of the infringement. .... "
Article five augments the powers accompanying the Injunction Directive.
It permits concerned parties to bring an action for injunction if the infringing
party does not cease infringement within two weeks after being notified that
it is in violation. 4 It also grants member states the power to impose monetary
damages for failure of violators to comply with its orders.55
In summary, there are several indications that the Injunction Directive is
a significant leap beyond the prior directives concerning consumer

4'Minister Secures Agreement for Europe-Wide Consumer Guarantees Directive, M2
PRESSw RE, Apr. 24, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 11308516.
4"Though this is qualified by the limitation "insofar as the legal system of the Member State
concerned so permits." Injunction Directive, supra note 27, art. 2(l)(c). This article also states
that an action under this directive will not prejudice actions under private international law. See
id. art. 2(2).
'0 See directives cited supranote 4 1.
s'Directives 1,6, 7, and 9, supra note 4 1, contain specific provisions on injunctive actions.
See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, annex.
52 Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 8, art. 7, par. 1.
s Injunction Directive, supra note 27, art. 2, par. 1(a)-(b).
14 See id. art.
5(1).
ssSee id. art. 2(1)(c).
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protection. 6 First is its breadth. The directive covers nine other directives and
thus concentrates the weight of EC pressure on member states to establish
uniform injunction proceedings."
Second, the application of mutual
recognition helps consumer organizations, at least technically, solve the nonrecognition problem. Finally, there is the very limited time that infringers
have before an injunction is to be issued. In tandem, these advantages may
make the whole of the Injunction Directive greater than the sum of its parts.
But internal limitations as well as the external limitations facing all EC
directives undermine the Injunction Directive's apparent strength.
B. THE LIMITS OF THE INJUNCTION DIRECTIVE
1. InternalLimits. Notwithstanding the progress the Injunction Directive
offers for consumer protection, as discussed in the above section, there are
many ways in which its efficacy is compromised. The purported goals of the
Injunction Directive are to mitigate the lag time endemic in the current EC and
member state enforcement mechanisms 8 and to address the "urgent need" for
approximation of national provisions regarding the issues listed in the annex.59
a. The LimitedNature of Group Actions. First among these limits is the
constraint on who may bring the actions. Due to the cost-benefit deterrent to
individual suits, a class action would seem the most appropriate means to
secure redress for the mass default. Assuming that the class action is possible,
it will still be inappropriate when a mass default arises in different jurisdictions, where claimants seek "vastly disparate" damages, and where different
remedies are sought, such as specific performance versus injunctive relief.6°
In Europe, where class actions are "almost non-existent," 6' a different
approach is required to address mass defaults anyway. In 1992, an author

s6 Whether it will become an actual advance will be seen in implementation.

See ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra note 30, para. 2.1 (a).
s8See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, para. (2).
"

S9

Id. para. (6).

6oTrakman, supra note 10, at 632. Trakman argues that the provision of a mandatory class
action, complemented by a public interest trust, is a way to resolve this sort of mass default via
compensation and preventing the mass defaulter from profiting from the default. Id. at 617. The
mandatory class action permits victims to only sue as a class, denying them the right to sue
individually. See id. at 618. The public interest trust then "disburses unclaimed damages among
public interest organizations for consumer use." Id.
61 Lindblom, supra note 9, at 822. This is because of the strong "traditional individualistic
civil procedure." Id. at 819. Despite the controversy surrounding class actions in Europe and
the opposition to them expressed by the EU, there are some voices within the EU and its member
states supporting the introduction of class actions. See id. at 823-24.
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wrote that a powerful impetus for considering the introduction of the class
action to Europe was the "stark reality that nothing worth mention [was] being
done in Europe to offer procedural civil justice in cases of mass
victimization." 62 In the case of European consumer protection, the public
interest is entrusted to a public prosecutor who has the capacity to bring
representative group actions. In other words, the avenue of redress for mass
defaults in the European legal system is limited to collective actions brought
by public representatives for groups of concerned consumers.63
The group action, prosecuted by public ministers, is not a class action suit.
It aggregates individual causes of action for individual recovery but operates
in a parallel and distinct fashion." The group action has been criticized as
being ineffectual, 65 and confidence in the efforts of the European officials
charged with bringing the actions is lacking.'
Under the Injunction Directive, only "qualified entities" may bring the
action. A "qualified entity" is:
any body or organisation which, being properly constituted
according to the law of a Member State, has a legitimate
interest in ensuring that the provisions referred to in Article
1 are complied with, in particular: (a) one or more independent public bodies, specifically responsible for protecting the
interests referred to in Article 1, in Member States in which
such bodies exist and/or (b) organisations whose purpose is to
protect the interests referred to in Article 1, in accordance
with the criteria laid down by their national law. 67
So, there is a limited group that may bring these actions. While in the
United States mass defaults are prosecuted as aggregates of private rights by
"private attorneys general" with the latitude to seek not only injunctions but
Richard B. C,ppalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for a ContinentalEurope? A
PreliminaryInquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 220 (1992).
63 See Lindblom, supranote 9, at 819-20. Lindblom notes that "group actions can serve as
abridge over the troubled water between traditional individualistic procedure and mass claims."
62

Id. at 820.
"See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 62, at 239-40.
6' See id. at 240.
' See id. at 218-19. This is not to say that the class action is a panacea. Legal professionals

have criticized class actions on the grounds that the attorneys are often better compensated than
the clients and that the settlement process is vulnerable to collusion. See Mark S. Davis &
Thomas R. Grande, Class Actions Benefit Consumers, TRIAL, Apr. 1, 1997, at 24.
' Injunction Directive, supra note 27, art. 3.
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also damages," the "qualified entity" limitation is the rule consistent with the
European "public action" approach to mass defaults and other situations.
The "qualified entities" (consumer organizations) at the national level vary
greatly in number and power, from one in the Netherlands to twenty in France,
and "on the whole [they] have relatively little clout." 9 This is obvious when
considering that, except in the United Kingdom and Germany, where
consumer associations are government funded, the various national and local
organizations are funded only by membership fees and by the voluntary work
performed by their members.70 Nearly all of the member states have nationallevel bodies representing the consumer organizations, so-called Consumer
Councils, but these tend to be "consultative bodies" that are just appendages
of the respective ministry responsible for consumer affairs. 71
There are problems with dispersing the responsibilities of ministries
charged with consumer protection. It is no help to the efficiency of integration
and harmonization that no member state has a ministry or agency responsible
specifically for consumer affairs. 7' Also, the fact that there are several
ministries jointly responsible for developing and enforcing consumer policy
makes it more difficult for member states to harmonize their policies.73
Furthermore, as in the case of the Unfair Contracts Directive, member states
often face vague instructions as to the degree, if any, that they are to vest

power in these organizations.74 Some member states resolve the ambiguity
against the consumer. For instance, in implementing the Misleading

See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 62, at 239-40. The authors criticize the "public
action" as being largely ineffectual. The authors define the threshold as to when an action
becomes a "class action" as when a proceeding "enables private suits to be brought which might
otherwise be economically infeasible ...

,"

and because the Injunction Directive does not

operate as such, it is not a grant of class actions. Id.
69 Consumer Policy in Austria as Compared with the Other Member States of the European
Union, at 7 (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://europe.eu.int/comm/dg24/library/reports/
nat.reports/rappauen.pdf> [hereinafter Comparative Consumer Policy].
70 See id.
7,Id. at 9-10.
72 See id. For example, in Austria, the responsible authority is the Federal Ministry of the
Feminine Condition and Consumer Protection, while the primary responsibility for developing
consumer policy is spread between the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of
Economic Affairs, and the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Youth and the Family. See id.
7 See id. at 6.
74See WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 86.
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Advertising Directive, the United Kingdom limited the consumer organization
to filing a complaint with the corresponding administrative authority. 7
Although the consumer organizations have traditionally been weak in their
role in the EC, they may soon be strengthened.76 A recent EC proposal for a
decision of the European Parliament and Council stated "it is also necessary
to strengthen the bodies and organizations that are active in the area of
consumer protection so that they can be a more effective driving force for
making consumers aware of the priorities set by the Community."' 77 The
proposal also stated that it is necessary to achieve community-level representation of consumers by these bodies in order to provide "significant support" to
them, to support organizations at the national or regional level by encouraging
collaboration among them, and to provide the necessary financial support for
them to carry out these tasks.7"
Articles two, five, and six of the Draft Proposal detail the Community's
funding objectives for the consumer organizations. Article five defines
consumer organizations as non-governmental, non-profit organizations that
protect the "interests and health of consumers,' have been required to
represent interests of consumers at the community level, represent consumers
of at least half of the member states, and are active at the national or regional
level.79 The Draft Proposal also outlines (in article seven) the criteria for an
organization being funded by the Community. 0 The sincerity of efforts to

71 See id. at 110. The United Kingdom interpreted the Misleading Advertising Directive as
"not allowing consumer organizations to initiate proceedings before Court." Monique Goyens,
Where There'sa Will, There'sa Way!: A Practitioner'sView, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER POLICY
AFTER MAASTRICHT, supra note 45, at 93, 101. But if the directive only requires group actions
and the groups are not allowed to get to court, how do the consumers get to court?
76 See Goyens, supra note 75, at 98.
' Draft Proposal for a Decision in Favor of Consumers, supra note 1, at 8.
7s Id.
' Id. at 11. The article five criteria were adopted in the Callfor Projectsto Promote and
ProtectConsumer Interests in 1999 (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/
library/tenders/call05_en.html> [hereinafter Call for Projects]. The Call for Projects is an
invitation for proposals to be submitted for review to see if they qualify for funding by the
Community. See id.
o Draft Proposal for a Decision in Favor of Consumers, supra note 1, at 12. The criteria
include:
a satisfactory level of cost effectiveness; an added value ensuring a high and
uniform level of the representation of consumers' interests; a lasting
multiplier effect at European Level; effective and balanced cooperation
between the various parties for planning and carrying out activities and for
financial participation; the development of lasting transnational cooperation,
especially by the exchange of experience to raise the awareness of consumers
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empower consumer organizations is evidenced by the detailed outline of
procedures, evaluation, and monitoring in chapter three of the Draft Proposal.8
It is further evidenced by the measures for community policing of the
organizations' use of funds,82 the objectives in areas of educating consumers
and producers of their respective rights and responsibilities regarding
community law, 3 and detailed outlay of funding of the organizations.8 The
success of the consumer organizations in securing consumers' rights under the
Injunction Directive and in uprooting mass defaulters, will very much depend
on their ability to offset the substantial resources of those mass defaulters.
This requires more than a proposal; it requires legislation.
b. Deference to Member States. There are many areas in which the
Injunction Directive defers to the member states on key issues of enforcement,
which could potentially enable the member states to undermine enforcement. 5
The preamble gives member states the choice of creating bodies to act as
"qualified" entities that enforce the Injunction Directive in particular or of
simply relegating the enforcement of the directive to existing bodies, whose
job it is to protect the collective interests of consumers as national law
dictates."
Consumers are disadvantaged in member states that opt to have their
consumer organizations take control of consumer actions under the second
option because:
[a] number of cases have shown that the authorities at the
place of the damage are not obliged to take legal action as
they are not the national bodies of the country of the individ-

and economic operators and by joint utilization of their results; the widest
possible dissemination of the results of the activities and projects supported;
the ability to analyze the situations to be covered, the means earmarked for
evaluating the activities and projects and their suitability for best practice.
Id. These criteria were adopted in the Call for Projects. Call for Projects, supra note 79.
"' See Draft Proposal for a Decision in Favor of Consumers, supra note 1, at 12.
82

See id. at 11.

83 See id.
84 See id. at 12-15. This outlay includes the allocation of 23 million ECUs to organizations
to promote and represent consumers' interests. See id. at 19. This would seem to grant the
organizations the ability to bring the injunction action.
8SThis deference starkly contrasts with the commission's acceptance ofresponsibility in the
preamble, paragraph 7, "Whereas the objective of the action envisaged can only be attained by
the Community; whereas it is therefore incumbent on the Community to act." Injunction
Directive, supra note 27, preamble, para. 7.
" Id. preamble, para. 9. The Corollary in the Body of the Directive is article three.
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ual affected. The interests of their own domestic consumers
might well not be affected by the goods or services intended
for foreign consumers."7
As one author notes, "The problem of insufficient means granted to
national supervisory authorities is a general problem which consumer policy
has to face: sophisticated legislation is of no use if it is not enforced by
stringent procedures." 8
Article four is a source of another significant weakness of the Injunction
Directive. It allows member states to limit application of mutual recognition
because the member state where the infringement took place can require the
foreign claimant to engage in court proceedings via a qualified entity from that
member state. 9 Even with mutual recognition, a defendant-friendly member
state could become a haven for infringement prone parties that move to that
state. That state would govern the administration of a case arising from an
infringement in that state regardless of the origin of the plaintiff party.
Furthermore, not all states sponsor consumer protection to the same degree.
"[T]he organizations of the northern countries are more structured and there
is a strong tradition of consumer awareness [as] compared to the Mediterranean countries."'9
Articles two and five contain more limits on the force of the directive by
deferring to member states. Article two, paragraph one, subsection (c) limits
the scope of the power to order losing defendants to pay into the public purse
or to any beneficiary named in national legislation for failure to abide by the
order of the injunction, to the degree that member state permits such punitive
orders.9 Article five allows the member states to create or keep rules that92
require the party seeking the injunction to first consult with the defendant.
This option, like others the member states are granted, allows for inconsistency

EC CONSUMER LAW 158 (1994).
s Goyens, supra note 75, at 100.
'9 The ESC stated that the enforcement of a requirement for an intermediary would vitiate
the principle of mutual recognition. See ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra
note 30, para. 3.3. This loophole could also lead to delay just by virtue of increased
administrative work, which would undermine the purpose of the directive in the first place. See
id.
o KENDALL, supra note 87, at 19.
9' See Injunction Directive, supra note 27, art. 2(l)(c).
9 See id. art. 5(1). But if the cessation of the infringement is not achieved within two weeks
from the date the request for consultation is received, then the plaintiff may bring the action for
injunction. See id.
87 VIVIENNE KENDALL,
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between the member states and thus undermines the standardization necessary
for confidence in the single market.93
c. No Damages Provision. One of the most glaring voids in the
Injunction Directive is the lack of an action for damages." An action for
damages arising from liability would be "an effective complement to
injunctions."95 This seems obvious. Supposing a mass default situation that
has continued for a significant period of time, over the course of which the
defaulter has amassed a significant amount of income by way of the default,
the defaulter may not be deterred by the possibility of a later injunction. The
defaulter in this situation would be able to take the money and run. The
problem is compounded by the presence of procedural barriers to the
implementation of the Injunction Directive. The longer it takes for the
member state governments to respond to this directive and enforce provisions
promulgated pursuant to it, the longer the defaulter can get away with
wrongfully injuring others that it will never have to actually compensate under
EC law.9
The commission stated that the Injunction Directive is designed to prevent
damages, "as distinct from actions for damages which are designed to 'make
good' the consequences. . . ," and that "clearly an action for an injunction can
play a preventative role only provided it is part of an effective and rapid
procedure."9' 7 However, given that community-level legislation is necessary
to achieve the harmonization to secure consumer confidence in the single
market and given the fact that legislation exists securing consumers' express
rights to compensation,98 it is apparent that the EC has the capacity to secure
this right. Why has it not done so? It may be that "[in principle, the
conditions to be fulfilled before the remedy can be granted are those applicable
under national law ....
,99 This does not explain why the Injunction Directive
does not include the added protection of a general damages provision.

93 See Brady, supra note 2, at 191 (addressing the problem of discrepancy where member
states may choose whether both direct and indirect damages would be available to a consumer
victim of a violation of Guarantee Proposal).
" See ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra note 30, para. 2.4.
9s Id.

National law, however, may make such recovery possible.
Proposal for Injunction Directive, supra note 4, at 10.
9'See, e.g., The Package Travel Directive, supra note 41, art. 5(2) (imposing liability for
damages caused to the consumer by organizers and retailers of package vacations).
" Sacha Prechal, EC Requirements for an Effective Remedy, in REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
EC LAW 3, 8 (Julian Lonbay & Andreia Biondi eds., 1997).
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Though there have been directives for consumer protection that do
expressly grant the right to seek remuneration, such as the Package Travel
Directive '0 and cancelled flight compensation regulation,' °1 other directives
have been gutted of their compensation provisions. For instance, the Directive

on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts0 2 was intended to provide the
following remedies for victims: reimbursement costs, replacement costs, repair
costs, or reduction of price if the buyer retains the goods.'0 3 Yet, there is no
such provision in the final version of the directive.' 4 This is probably because
the passage of consumer legislation does not occur without countervailing
political pressure. Each piece of consumer legislation has its corresponding
industry adversary.'0 5 And because the Injunction Directive covers a breadth

'0 The Package Travel Directive provides that the seller shall be liable to package travel
consumers for damages incurred by the consumer arising from a breach by the seller, subject to
the terms the member state may set out as grounds for exoneration, or the exculpatory terms in
the directive itself. See Silingardi, supra note 24, at 616-17.
Council Regulation 295/91 on Establishing Common Rules for Denied Boarding
Compensation System, 1991 O.J. (L 36) 5. This regulation is very limited in scope but
consumer friendly in that it guarantees compensation in cases where consumers have been
denied boarding of a plane for which they had a ticket. New proposals for an amendment to the
directive would increase the amount to which passengers are entitled in the case of overbooking,
the value of which will be immediately redeemable at the check-in desk. See Commission Press
Release IP/98/1 10,A irlinesMustProvideHigherCompensationto PassengersDeniedBoarding
on OverbookedFlightsunderNewEuropean Commission Proposals,Jan. 30, 1998 (visited Apr.
10, 2000) <http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/starttcgi/guesten.ksh> (search under IP reference
number).
102 Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 8.
103 See Huet, supra note 2, at 594-95 (discussing article six of the Amended Proposal for a
Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1992 O.J. (C 73) 7) [hereinafter
Proposed Directive on Unfair Contracts]; see also Brady, supra note 2, at 174 (noting the
weakening of the Unfair Contracts Directive by the deletion of the compensation portion).
104 See Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 8.
'o See Brady, supra note 2, at 196-98 (noting the considerable clout industry trade groups
exerted in demonstrating great opposition to the Commission Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Guarantees, COM(95)
520 final at 1 [hereinafter Proposal on Guarantees]). These groups decry the supposed
expensive and cumbersome obstacles the directive would throw into the single market in an
attempt to kill it or at least water it down. See Emma Tucker, EU to Regulate Financial
Services, FiN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 2 (noting banks' criticism of proposals for a directive to
regulate the sale of financial services by phone, post, and Internet in the EU, based on their
position that the regulation would increase the barriers to cross-border business by imposing
unfair costs on the to-be-regulated services versus face to face sales. See generally Couglin,
supra note 2, at 147-48 (addressing the root of this confrontation, the "conflicting goals of
consumer protection and free trade").
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of activities across industries, it is logical that there must have been industry
pressure correlative of this combination.
It is therefore logical to think that any measure granting broad rights to
consumers to redress grievances stemming from mass defaults would be
attacked by industry groups and face reluctant implementation and inefficacy
due to the weakness of the agencies charged with executing it. The degree of
resistance is probably directly related to the strength of the measure."
Finally, the annex includes only a very limited group of directives dealing
with consumer protection and leaves out very important ones, such as those
dealing with product safety and the directives on banking and insurance.""
The commission stated that it chose these directives because "of the impact of
their infringement on consumer interests and on the smooth functioning of the
Single Market. 10 8 This is vague and begs the question of what way these
directives specially impact consumer interests in ways that the omitted
consumer protection directives do not.'
2. External Limits. Even if the Injunction Directive was a facially
powerful consumer protection measure, the historical and real world
limitations on the effectiveness of directives will compromise the Injunction
Directive's capacity to address the incidences it is generally geared toward
resolving, and the mass default situation in particular.
a. Subsidiarity. In order to abate the threat of differing levels of
consumer protection among the member states on the integration of a single
market, the EC has sought to harmonize consumer protection legislation
among the member states.1 The European government is limited in the
breadth and depth of community-level legislation by the principle of
"subsidiarity." This principle, derived from article 3(b) of the EC Treaty,

'o See Brady, supra note 2, at 198 (making a similar hypothesis that "[]udging by the hostile
reaction to the Proposal [on Guarantees], the Directive must be accomplishing some good for

the consumer").
"07See ESC Opinion on Injunction Directive Proposal, supra note 30, para. 3.2. The ESC
Opinion urged that there should be a right to bring the Injunction action for violation of any
provision that is designed either directly or indirectly to protect consumers, if an injunction
would be an effective redress for such violation. Id. This does not address why the product
safety and banking directives were left out. The answer may have something to do with the
strength of the respective lobbies. Brady argued that the industry groups have considerable clout
in affecting community legislation and that this clout was a threat to the strength of consumer
protection legislation. Brady, supra note 2, at 198.
'0 Proposal for Injunction Directive, supra note 4, at 9.
'09The commission did state that other community acts may broaden the scope of the
Injunction Directive to cover other substantive areas. See id.
"' See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 153.
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limits the EC to action that is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaty.
The EC is supposedly limited to circumstances in which common action of the
member states and the EC is a necessity."' The principle has been understood
to mean that a cross-border character of the action was contemplated." 2
Though this is a vague guideline, it is known that one of the express objectives
of the treaty is a "high level" of consumer protection."
But subsidiarity is not a neutral principle. By the actions of some member
states, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, subsidiarity may be used as
a shield against consumer protection policy. Germany has repeatedly invoked
the principle to attempt to gouge consumer protection directives." 4 But
community institutions have also been criticized for hiding behind the shield
of subsidiarity, shielding the EU from progress in consumer protection. One
commentator writes, "There has been particular resistance to EC involvement
in action to improve consumer access to justice and redress for disputes
concerning cross-border purchases of defective goods and services."".5 More
acutely, "[s]ubsidiarity cloaks a failure to act with the respectability of a
principled stand. Member States have interpreted it as a concise formula for
inaction at any level rather' than
as a vehicle for establishing the appropriate
6
level for effective action.""
At the core of the subsidiarity issue is the "allocation of competence"
between member states and the Community. It will be necessary for member
states to participate heavily in the development of community law and
integration of the single market. Just as consumers need to have confidence
that other member states will play by the same rules, they must be confident
that their country has participated in the development of the rules, which it too
must abide by."7
b. The Limited Nature of Directives. In addition to the limits that
subsidiarity poses, directives are easily watered down as the member states

..See

PAOLO MENGOzZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM COMMON MARKET TO

EUROPEAN UNION 297-98 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992).

11 See id.
113EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 129.
"' See WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 32.
". Leigh Gibson, Subsidiarity: The Implicationsfor Consumer Policy, 16 J. CONSUMER
POL'Y 323, 337 (1993).
"6 Id. But see Hans W. Micklitz & Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Policy in the European
Community: Before and After Maastricht, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER POLICY AFTER
MAASTRICHT, supra note 46, at 33 (arguing that this perception is improper and that subsidiarity
is both a way to empower the member states and a way to compel them to adopt policy in fields
where the Community has a common policy, such as in consumer protection).
"7 See Micklitz & Weatherill, supra note 116,
at 28.
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implement them in their legislation. A directive is implemented under a
minimum harmonization model, which means that member states must adopt
a certain level of regulation prescribed by the directive but may go further
(which implies a low baseline). 1 8 This method in itself creates a problem
insofar as some states simply "bolt on" measures implementing directives to
already existing national legislation, which makes the rule confusing, its
incorporation perfunctory, and thus dissipates its intended effect." 9
More specifically, according to article 189 of the EEC Treaty, directives
apparently are only binding to the extent of the result to be achieved, not to the
form or method of implementation.' 20 That is, "EC Directives have no
horizontal direct effect . .[;] they cannot directly impose obligations on
private parties.''. Directives, then, cannot be used themselves as bases for
legal action. Rather, directives operate to have a vertical effect on the rights
of parties in member states by imposing obligations on the member states to
develop a body of law that determines the rights of those parties. 2 2 This
characteristic is a strength to the extent "that it allows norms derived from
Community law to be absorbed into established national structures.... ." But
it is a weakness to the extent that the "[c]ommunity law origins of the legal
rule may be obscured,' 24and their impact diluted, by its indirect route into the
national legal order.'
The external limits on the effectiveness of the Injunction
Directive-subsidiarity and the limited nature of directives-harm mass
default actions if they harm the Injunction Directive. Because the Injunction

See WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 86.
"9 See id. at 86-87.
"'

See id. at 138.
Christiaan W. A. Timmermans, Application of Community Law by National Courts:
(Limits to) DirectEffect andSupremacy, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY
29, 30 (Rosa H. M. Jansen et al. eds., 1997). This principle was laid out in Case 152/84, M. H.
Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 1986
E.C.R. 723 and in Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Sri, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325. In
FacciniDori,the European Court of Justice refused to extend the doctrine to provide horizontal
effect of directives-to permit individuals or enterprises to sue each other based on a nonimplemented directive.
122 See Timmermans, supra note 121, at 31. But, under European Court of Justice case law,
"persons [may] invoke the provisions of a directive-as long as they are sufficiently precise and
unconditional-before the national courts, in order to obtain redress from the State if the latter
has failed to transpose the directive in question within the period laid down. ..." Christos G.
Yeraris, CommunityLaw andthe GreekAdministrativeCourts,in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE
NATIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 121, at 58.
12 WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 138-39.
'24 Id. at 139.
'20

I21
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Directive spells out its provisions and the mandates with relatively more force
and clarity than other consumer protection directives, the member states may
not be able to avoid implementing the measures to the extent envisioned by
their drafters, or these states may be challenged ifthey do. As the deadline for
implementing the Injunction Directive is not for another year, several years
will likely pass before the effects of these external limits are seen.
V. OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EC LEGAL SYSTEM

A. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a constitutional court whose
purpose is to "secure uniformity in the interpretation and application of
community law and guide its development.' ' 25 Some say that it has become
a victim of its own success; it is in many ways "the most successful international court in the world community," with its fundamental function in the
community legal order well established. 2 6 It has become a popular forum for
litigation because (1) there is a large body of law for which it is the sole
authoritative interpreter and (2) enforcement of its judgment is relatively
effective. 27 While it is not the forum used by a consumer organization to
challenge a mass defaulter, its history in giving force to the mandate for the
member states to implement directives indicates a possible predisposition
toward interpreting the duties of the member states in this area in a very proconsumer way.
Despite the procedural hurdles that obstruct actions in favor of consumers
and the limits on the efficiency of application of the directives," there are
factors in the EC legal system that may operate to help ensure the consumer
initiatives success. The ECJ has been an activist court in assuring the
protection of the rights of individuals in the single market. The ECJ has
suffered attacks on its power because of its efforts to balance the development
of "its principled and daring case-law on judicial protection within member
states with regard to the Community rule of law" while being careful to
delineate the scope of community powers strictly.2 9 For example, in case of
repugnancy between national and community laws, under the Frankovich
125 BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE ROLE AND FUTURE

OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (1996) [hereinafter ROLE AND FUTURE].
126 Id. at 23.
127 See id.
128See supra

Part IV.

129Timmermans, supra note 121, at 36.
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decision, community law must be looked to by national judges. 3 0 This is the
principle of primacy, which prohibits the subordinate legal orders of member
states from passing legislation contrary to community legislation.'
The
principle of direct effect of community legislation, which allows individuals
or enterprises to claim rights established by the Community but not yet in
member state law, further promotes the interest of individuals.1 32 Some argue
that these developments indicate that the ECJ has acted to ensure that there
will be "real teeth" in the enforcement of community rules.
There are several ways in which the ECJ has "given concrete shape" to the
right of individuals to enforce their community-granted rights: 33 1) by
allowing direct effect of those "Community Treaties which are unconditionally
formulated and sufficiently precise: vertically, so that they can be relied upon
before a national court against the member state concerned; later on, also
horizontally, that is that they can be relied upon against other private
parties";" 2) by giving vertical direct effect "to provisions of directives which
are unconditional and sufficiently precise"; 3) by requiring interpretation of
national law to be consistent with directive provisions where national law has
not yet adopted the provision; and 4) by requiring member states to compensate individuals for damages suffered as a consequence
of a failure to adopt the
35
directive provisions in the prescribed time.1
Whether the Injunction Directive will have direct effect will depend on
whether it "(i) impose[s] duties of 'non action,' such as the duty to obey to a
negative rule and (ii) appear[s] to be unconditional and sufficiently precise to
exclude any discretion of the Member States.' 3 6
Another principle has arisen under EC case law that may afford consumer
organizations the right to seek actual compensation. If the Injunction
Directive is not implemented to the degree required under law and someone
has suffered damages as a result thereof, community case law states that
parties may seek compensation "commensurate with the loss or damage

'o See Walter Van Gerven, The ECJ's Recent Case-Law in the Field of Tort Liability:
Towards European Ius Commune?, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONs OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY,

supra note 121, at 91, 104-05.
" See Goebel, supra note 32, at 160.
132See id.
"3 Van Gervern, supra note 130, at 96.
134 Id.
13Sld.
136 Stefano

Zunarelli, Package Travel Contracts: Remarks on the European Community

Legislation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 489, 509 (1994).
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suffered, so as to ensure the effective protection for their rights."' 3 7 This is
because "[o]ne of the most important cornerstones of the case-law of the ECJ
is that private parties, either as natural persons or legal entities, should have
the opportunity to ensure that rights derived from Community law can actually
be upheld by judicial means."' 38 And "because of the necessity of uniform
application of Community law throughout the Community, there should be
sufficiently harmonized rules which allow individuals to enforce these rules
by way of sanctions and legal remedies which are, if not the same, then at least
equivalent in all Member States."' 3 9 Following this line of reasoning, the
Marshall II decision, which "made clear that the loss and damage actually
sustained as a result of [a] discriminatory dismissal [in violation of a directive
prohibiting discrimination in the workplace] should be 'made good in full,' "
removed the arbitrary damages ceiling in the member state in question.'" This
opinion, along with Frankovich, indicates a willingness by the ECJ to issue
decisions that implement directives that have real force. This is evidenced by
the rulings that punishment for failing to adopt directives or for maintaining
policies inconsistent with them should be of a certain severity regardless of the
state's determination. "[O]ne of the most important developments in EC law
recently has been the expansion of the ability of the individual right to sue in
national courts on the basis of EC law and rely on a proper remedy in the form
of compensation." 4
But while the commission appears to be facing up to its responsibility as
guardian of the treaty by permitting infringement proceedings against member

states, in practice, there are major problems with relying on the commission
to secure individual consumer interests." The procedures have been called
slow, difficult, and politicized.'43 Furthermore, the relegation of disputes

brought by national parties assumes that there is efficacious access to justice
in the member states for all prospective plaintiffs, that the national lawyers are
properly trained in EC law and know enough to recognize existence of claims,
137 Van Gerven, supra note 130, at 103. But those suffering damages may only seek
compensation where: 1) the rule of law that was infringed was intended to bestow rights on the
individual; 2) the breach is sufficiently serious; or 3) there is a "direct causal link between the
breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties."

Id. at 100.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
140 Goebel, supra note 32, at 163.
"" Jacquelyn F. MacLennan, Decentralized Enforcement of EC Law: Is the European
Commission Still the Guardian ofthe Treaties?,91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 164, 169 (1997).
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and that the member states are all abiding by their article five obligations to
apply EC law. 44 Furthermore, infringement proceeding judgments by the ECJ
pursuant to EC article 17 1(1) are declaratory only, and the court does not have
power to enforce them. 145 In the context of the mass default, it would be even
truer that "[t]he daunting prospect of pursuing an action against the state to
recover a relatively small sum would dissuade the vast majority of consumers. '9046There have also been cumbersome delays in which member states may
act illicitly for four to five years in the case of infringement proceedings.'47
But again, these delays may be curtailed if the case law allows actions for
damages for failure to implement and if there are consumer organizations
empowered enough to bring such actions.
B. Out-of-Court Settlements
Though the Injunction Directive does not contain a general damages
provision, there are damage provisions in some of the directives listed in its
annex. "48
' However, the consumer's likelihood of using legislation enacting
these directives as the basis for recovery is still unlikely in the mass default
situation due to all the reasons that allow the mass default to slip by.
One way that the European Community attempts to make up for the lack
of the class action is by its emphasis and use of out-of-court settlements of
disputes. The commission has attempted to answer what it called an "urgent
need for Community action in regard to the settlement of consumer
disputes."' 49 Addressing the mass default problem in a way, the communication highlights that one of the paramount goals of the Community is to
"facilitate the settlement of consumer disputes by resolving the problems
arising from the disparity between the economic value at stake and the cost of
its judicial settlement."' 5 ° This communication outlines two methods designed
to achieve this goal: by a complaint form "designed to facilitate communication between consumers and professionals, and should an amicable solution

See id. at 170.
See ROLE AND FUTURE, supra note 125, at 18.
146 WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 144.
47 See ROLE AND FUTURE, supra note 125, at 3.
'" See Injunction Directive, supra note 28, annex.
"9 Communication from the commission on "the out-of-court settlement of consumer
disputes" and commission recommendation on the principles applicable to the bodies
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, COM(98)198 final at 2 [hereinafter
Communication on Settlements].
'so Id. at 2.
'4
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prove impossible," facilitate out-of-court procedures and by a recommendation
outlining the rules for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.'
The communication acknowledges several of the problems facing
consumers seeking justice in the courts: 1) the high cost of legal consultation,
representation, expert opinions, and court fees; 2) the requirement in many
member states that the plaintiff pay defendant's costs if plaintiff loses; and 3)
the long delays arising from backlogs of cases in the member states.'52 These
are in addition to the psychological barriers arising from the formalism and
complexity associated with court procedures.'53 Furthermore, these barriers
are exacerbated when the dispute is between member states." The result of
the barriers has been that "many consumers do not even try to assert their
rights and simply allow them to be infringed" upon in light of the limited
value of the dispute. 5 Three possible solutions include making judicial
procedure and access more efficient, improving communication between
sellers and consumers, and using out-of-court procedures.
The "solution" of an amicable resolution to disputes between businesses
and consumers is premised on the assumption that businesses will seek to
avoid problems with consumers in order to preserve good will and business
relationships. 56 However, this ignores the possibility of intentional defrauding
by a business and the corresponding likelihood of that business sacrificing
good will to the benefit of profit. Even if individual customer good will is
material, there is nothing in this framework to prevent the business from
simply paying off that particular consumer to keep him quiet and happy, while
still floating above the reaches of mass justice for the remaining defrauded
customers. The communication acknowledges that "fruitful communication
is obstructed through lack of consumer information," the language barrier
when dealing with other countries, and the lack of sophistication of the
consumer for filling out the forms properly.'5
It may nonetheless be the out-of-court settlement that provides the
predominant mode of consumer redress in the mass default situation. A
variety of out-of-court methods already exist in the member states, including
mediation, arbitration, and other supplementary measures. "8 The out-of-court
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15 See Communication on Settlements, supra note 149, at 5.
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settlements may be initiated by public authorities, individual political
associations, or firms offering mediation services. The goal is to get out-ofcourt procedures that most closely resemble courtroom adjudication in their
independence and impartiality while at the same time improving access to
justice. ' 9 The communication acknowledges the inherent flaws of out-ofcourt settlement, including the flexibility that allows for circumvention of
strict application and difficulties in implementing decisions."
The communication posits safeguards, in addition to respect for principles
such as transparency, independence, and effectiveness, that will make for more
reliability and confidence. First, consumers should be able to use their state's
court system without compromising their claim. 6 1 Second, bodies responsible
for out-of-court settlement will have mutual confidence in their member
counterparts. 62 The ultimate goal is that by networking the various resolution
bodies, consumers will be able to "refer cross-border disputes to the competent
out-of-court body in the foreign country via the corresponding out-of-court

body in their own country." 6'
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, to truly secure consumer confidence in the single market,
perhaps class actions should be permitted to deal with mass default situations,
where the smallness of each plaintiff's claim effectively immunizes the
defendant from suit.'" In the United States, class actions severely impact
court dockets because of the "tremendous processing demands they place on
judges and staff.'', 65 But the judicial infrastructure necessary to handle class
actions may not exist in all member states. A country like Italy, whose judges
are not accustomed to taking the active role necessary to run a class action suit,
is ill-equipped for such an option.' Under the law of some member states
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61 See id. at 10
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" Id. The commission has created a database of organizations and resolution bodies
pursuant to the goals of this recommendation.
'"See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 62, at 240-41.
16 Id. at 256.
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such as Italy and under EC law, class actions are not going to become
mechanisms for consumer redress, and mass defaults may go unremedied 67
Consumer confidence in the single market will likely have to be built
incrementally, on the foundation of many modest measures, rather than by
sweeping changes in the law. The member states themselves, in a response to
a EU Survey 68 regarding their consumer protection policy, made suggestions
on what measures the EC should propose to support and supplement policy in
favor of consumers. For instance, Austria suggested that "the Commission
should ensure that market surveillance is improved in the Member States so
as to achieve a comparable and high level of consumer protection throughout
the Community.', 169 Very recent developments in consumer policy indicate a
tendency of the commission to strengthen consumer protection measures in the
Community. For instance, the new Consumer Action Program for 1999-2001
defines the protection of the consumer's economic interest as a top priority. 70
The program calls for community "measures" to promote consumer protection
rather than "actions" under the EC treaty. 7 '
The Injunction Directive is a modest measure, but its concreteness gives
some weight to the rhetoric about consumer protection. Despite its internal
and external limitations, it does at least advance consumer protection in a more
sweeping manner than other measures by designating a whole group of
offenses and speeding up the remedies for them. It remains to be seen what
force, if any, the directive will have, as cases have not yet arisen under
implementing member state legislation.

67 See id.

This article describes what will happen to the "small investor who suffers modest
damage due to the fraud or fault of company executives.... The damage being minute makes
the lawsuit impossible given: the uncertain results of his judicial initiative, particularly in fields
where precise legal guidelines are lacking; cost of legal assistance disproportionate to the size
of the grievant's claim; and the difficulties of collecting proof of defendants' illegal conduct and
the quantum of plaintiffs damages. The rational litigant can do nothing but suffer the loss
instead of increasing it by futile legal action, risking a strong spiritual anxiety, and suffering
probable final disappointment both in the 'if' and the 'what' of the legal remedy sought." Id.
at 267.
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370 Consumer Protection in the EUl: Consumer Action Plan, BUS. EUROPE, Dec. 16, 1998,
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